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Abstract
From some years now, the social sciences have been highlighting the existence of a type 
of goods that are neither material things, nor ideas, nor functional performances but consist, 
instead, of social relations and, for this reason, are called relational goods. This contribution 
proposes to clarify this concept from the viewpoint of relational sociology, which avoids 
both methodological individualism and holism. Subsequently, it argues that such goods can be 
produced only by specific social subjects, which the author calls «relational subjects». Relying 
upon many theoretical and empirical researches, the paper explains in which sense and in 
which way relational subjects, and the goods they generate, can contribute to making civil 
society more robust: that is, no longer the typically capitalist society of the market, but an «as-
sociational» society able to sustain a mature democracy.
Keywords: relational goods, relational sociology, relational subjects, civil society, civil 
democracy.
Resumen
Desde hace algunos años, las ciencias sociales han resaltado la existencia de un tipo de 
bienes que no son ni cosas materiales, ni ideas, ni prestaciones funcionales pero que consis-
ten, en cambio, en relaciones sociales. Por esta razón se les llama bienes relacionales. Este 
texto propone aclarar este concepto desde el punto de vista de la sociología relacional, evi-
tando tanto el individualismo como el holismo metodológico. Posteriormente, se argumenta 
que tales bienes pueden ser producidos únicamente por sujetos sociales específicos, que el 
autor denomina como «sujetos relacionales». Apoyándose en numerosas investigaciones teó-
ricas y empíricas, el texto explica en qué sentido y de qué manera los sujetos relacionales, y 
los bienes que generan, pueden contribuir a que la sociedad civil sea más robusta. Entendién-
dola no como la sociedad típicamente capitalista de mercado, sino como una sociedad «aso-
ciativa» capaz de sostener una democracia madura.
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In SEARCH OF ‘OTHER GOODS’ THAT COnFER SOLIDITy  
On A RObuST DEmOCRATIC CIvIL SOCIETy
For some years now the social sciences have been highlighting the ex-
istence of a type of goods that are neither material things, nor ideas, nor 
functional performances but consist, instead, of social relations and, for this 
reason, are called relational goods.
This contribution proposes, first of all, to clarify this concept and, sub-
sequently, to show that such goods can be produced only by specific social 
subjects, which I call «relational subjects». We shall then see in which sense 
and in which way relational subjects, and the goods they generate, can con-
tribute to making civil society more robust: that is, no longer the typically 
modern civil society –the bourgeois society of the market– but an «associa-
tional» society able to sustain a mature democracy as a welfare society’s form 
of governance.
It is important to emphasize from the beginning that the type of goods 
that I call relational cannot be traced back to traditional or premodern forms 
of social organization because they require conditions that only modernity 
has created by making individuals more free and guaranteeing the maximum 
amount of social mobility. For a long time these goods have been dismissed 
or even repressed by capitalistic society as well as by societies dominated 
by dictatorships. Today they are emerging as the yeast of an advanced de-
mocracy. They are created precisely where relations between consociates are 
tendentially symmetrical (not hierarchical), free, and responsible (not con-
strained by authoritative norms or powers), not mercantile or, in any case, 
not dictated by the pursuit of individual profit. 
Empirical studies show how widespread they really are. These are goods 
that are invisible to the naked eye (they are intangible goods) and are con-
tinually sought out by people, but they come into existence only under par-
ticular conditions. As examples we could think of goods such as the follow-
ing: trust between people or families in difficulty who are willing to help 
one another; a collaborative and serene climate in a company; the feeling of 
safety among the residents of a neighborhood; a social or health service able 
to improve the quality of relations between parents and offspring; the spirit 
of collaboration in a sports team; cooperation among members of an orches-
tra; an internet site that receives and gives useful information to a group of 
people interested in that service; and so on. Our life is a continual search for 
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relational goods, but we have a very limited awareness of what they are and 
how they can be generated and regenerated.
We are seeing a relational good when the participating individuals them-
selves produce and enjoy it together. An example is the collaboration in a 
scientific research team. The participants can be not only individuals, but 
groups or social networks too. In the latter case, the relational goods take 
on a more complex organizational character. For instance, we could think 
of small associations of families constituting a second level network or asso-
ciation with goals of reciprocal mutuality; another example is volunteerism 
among single local associations. Or we could think of a second level network 
among single social cooperatives that create a fabric of strong cohesion and 
social solidarity in a certain territory. The relational good, in other words, 
primarily concerns people and their relations (primary goods). But it can 
also be situated at a level of secondary relations among people who do not 
directly know one another, as a result of their sharing an associative affilia-
tion (in these cases, relational goods are said to be secondary because they 
do not involve face-to-face relations). 17
In essence, relational goods have the following properties: they are not 
«things» but consist of social relations that have a sui generis reality; they are 
produced and enjoyed together by those who participate in them; the good 
that they entail is an emergent effect which redounds to the benefit of par-
ticipants as well as of those who share in its repercussions from the outside, 
without any single subject’s having the ability to appropriate it for him/her-
self. Relational goods have an intrinsically democratic character in that they 
distinguish themselves from bureaucratic organizations (such as the public 
administration) that act on command and generate goods that redound to 
their surrounding community’s benefit (whether territorial or not). They are 
not particularistic and closed goods, such as those sought by groups con-
nected to lobbyists or the mafia. Perhaps the best way to understand them 
is to refer to Alexis de Tocqueville’s key concept when he showed that the 
fundamental source of nourishment for a modern liberal-democratic society 
is «the art of associationism.» He gave an essentially civic version of this. For 
Tocqueville, in fact, democratic associations are those that gather together 
citizens in order to solve the problems of a political community (such as, for 
example, creating a public garden or placing a fountain in a square). Today 
we have at our disposal a more extensive and refined theory of those goods 
that pertain to the art of associating for civic and civil ends.2
1 For more details and empirical evidences see Donati and Solci (2011).
2 On the distinction between the terms «civil value and «civic value» see Cortina et al. (2008) and 
Pollini (2009: 19-80).
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RELATIOnAL GOODS ARE A REALITy THAT ESCAPES  
THE PubLIC/PRIvATE DICHOTOmy
The concept of relational good arises primarily from dissatisfaction with 
a dichotomy, introduced by modernity, between public and private, which 
separates and classifies every type of good into one or the other domain. That 
which is public is understood to be accessible to everyone and impersonal. 
That which is private is understood to be available only to autonomous sub-
jects who are its owners. Consequently, society is distinguished into a public 
sphere, in which sociality is neutral and open, and a private sphere, in which 
sociality is particularistic and closed. It is obvious to ask: is there nothing in 
between? And in addition: if by chance there were something in between, 
would this possible «third» not be such as to redefine the two poles of public 
and private? 
Once modernity obliges the social organization to divide social goods into 
public as opposed to private goods, it generates evident gaps and vacuums. 
Where can we then seek out those goods in which the sociability of human 
persons and their social networks is expressed without such forms’ having 
necessarily to be ascribed to the public or private arena?
With the term «sociability» (Simmel, 1981: 121-136) I am referring to so-
cial relationality, which can be interpersonal (face-to-face) but also more 
impersonal (as in organizations or social movements in which it becomes 
synonymous with a sense of belonging) on condition that the latter is ac-
tive and consists of reciprocal actions (even if at a distance) that generate 
emergent effects of a prosocial nature. Just to give a few examples, we could 
think of friendship and neighborhood networks, self-help and mutual aid net-
works, and small groups that carry out many initiatives to help the weakest 
and least fortunate members of society; or, at another level, there are social 
movements (whether local, global, or glocal) that actively intervene in civic 
problems and peer-to-peer social networks that produce shared goods on 
the internet. In all of these cases, it would be difficult to ascribe the initiatives 
to the strictly private or public arena. There is an «intermediate» social space 
that remains little explored. 
The concept of relational good fills in the gap between private and public 
goods. It points to a reality in which certain aspects of what is private are 
intertwined with some aspects of what is public, without being either one or 
the other. In any case, relational goods are essential in order to make society 
less impoverished, risky, insecure, mistrustful, and pathological in many of 
its aspects. It is important to emphasize that these realities could not exist 
before modernity transformed the intermediate social sphere between pub-
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lic and private into a desert. Those who think of relational goods as a revival 
of things from the past that were typical of premodern society (such as the 
confraternities or charitable organizations) would be committing a serious 
error of perspective.
To say this better: the typically modern polarization between the pub-
lic sphere (identified in the state) and the private sphere (identified in the 
capitalistic market) entails the birth of social forms that have a sociability of 
which the quality is different from the forms present in traditional societies, 
such as the medieval religious confraternities, the monte di pietà, the chari-
table entities for the poor and sick, and other similar institutions. The reason 
for the difference lies in the processes of multiplication of the intersecting 
circles that produce a new individuality3 and, consequently, a different type 
of sociability. In premodern societies the forms of sociability that create rela-
tional goods are generally of an ascriptive and asymmetrical type as regards 
power relationships: the positions of those who participate are not egalitar-
ian but reflect stratification by class. In modernized societies, instead, they 
are of an acquisitive and tendentially symmetrical type as regards the power 
relationships among participants in as much as the old social stratification 
diminishes and a principle of equality asserts itself.
The notion of the relational good emerges when one becomes aware of 
the existence of other goods that are neither available on the basis of the pre-
rogative of private ownership nor accessible to everyone indiscriminately. 
They are goods that do not have an owner, nor are they of the generically 
understood collectivity. They are the goods of human sociability, goods that 
are crucial for the very existence of society, which could not survive without 
them. If these goods are ignored dismissed, or repressed, the entire social 
fabric is impoverished, mutilated, and deprived of life blood with serious 
harm caused to people and the overall social organization. Those who do not 
understand this point or seek to trace relational goods to either the public or 
private arena fail completely to understand relational goods’ meaning, mode 
of being, functions, and social value. Let us consider a few examples of rela-
tional goods.
A group of parents decides to constitute an association for organizing 
educational services for their own children, which will also be available to 
other children in the community, and they obtain spaces and payment for 
utilities from the municipality while they themselves manage the actual ser-
vice (for example, a nursery, pre-school, or primary school): is this initiative 
3 We owe to Georg Simmel the idea that the individualization of people is increasingly enhanced the 
greater the number of «social circles» (associations, groups, communication and exchange networks) 
in which individuals participate: cf. Simmel (1972).
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public or private? To modern eyes it would be private because the parents 
manage it, but the agreement with the municipality complicates things since 
it takes place on public property, and, moreover, the agreement with the 
municipality stipulates accountability and inspections, or supervision, at the 
very least. Everyone sees that here the public/private categories do not grasp 
the initiative’s more truly social nature.
A group of families that share a given problem (they have a disabled child, 
a non-autonomous elderly relative, an alcoholic or dependent family member, 
etc.) create an association to help one another in turn (mutual aid) and to 
take actions of advocacy (demanding rights), both for themselves as well 
as for the other families facing the same situation: is this association private 
or public? There is no doubt that it is private, but does it correspond to mo-
dernity’s definition of the private (according to which the private is such 
because it lacks public responsibilities)? I think not.
More generally, we can think of the social goods produced by Third sec-
tor (non-profit) organizations that deliver care-giving services to people, not 
only to disabled persons or those with serious pathologies, but also to healthy 
people who have need of support in terms of educational services, social 
and health care assistance, sport and cultural services, and so on. It is obvi-
ous to point out that the grounds for activity of an associative and network 
type that we call «the domain of the social,» to use the social term for that 
which exists between the public and the private (Arendt, 1958), does not 
only generate good things (relational goods) but also less good things (rela-
tional evils). For example, if we ask people who participate in an association 
whether, in recent years, trust toward other members of the association has 
grown or decreased, we can have cases in which trust has grown and other 
cases in which it has decreased. In the case of a relational evil, their answer 
will be of the following type: «The more I participated in the association, the 
more I saw that one cannot trust the other members of the association.» So-
cial relations can thus generate negative instead of positive effects. Therefore, 
it is of the greatest importance to identify the (cultural, structural, agential) 
conditions in which relational goods, rather than evils, are generated. 
Can we make a list of these goods? The type of good about which I am 
speaking is not a category that can be inventoried, as one does for material 
goods. This does not mean that we are dealing with a purely ideal good, that 
is, a value in an abstract or only symbolic sense. It is an intangible good in 
which energy and resources can be invested and from which energy and 
resources are drawn. If it is not taken to heart (cared for), the relational 
good deteriorates and can disappear. In essence, the relational good cannot 
be catalogued as a functionally specific good but, rather, is a way to gener-
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ate goods – which can be material or not, such as, for example, children’s 
education, the production of consumer goods, a sports team’s or an orches-
tra’s performance, a scientific research group’s results, the services offered 
by a volunteer group. These goods would be impoverished, commodified, 
or bureaucratized if they were not produced in this relational way. Using a 
questionable expression, we could say that what is important in relational 
goods is their «mode of production» because relational goods are thus from 
the generative point of view (regarding how they are generated and work 
together to generate other goods). This mode of production requires particu-
lar social subjects. Precisely for this reason, both the relational goods and the 
subjects that produce them are fragile and vulnerable. In any case, the type of 
good that I call relational is not on the same plane as the public-private axis 
conceived in the modern sense. It exists on another level of reality, a level 
that is obscured by the public-private axis. How do we manage to see it?
HOW DID THE THEORy OF RELATIOnAL GOODS ARISE?
The theory of relational goods did not arise out of nothingness but ger-
minated in a terrain that had been previously tilled and sowed. This terrain is 
the one in which, given that social goods cannot be traced back or reduced 
to the modern categories of public and private, the concept of social pri-
vate was elaborated. The term «social private» indicates every sphere that is 
private as regards property and management but which has prosocial ends, 
and not ends of instrumental expediency for the participants (Donati, 2008: 
13-47). Expediency for the participants is not excluded but cannot be the 
associative end, which must be social solidarity both inside and toward the 
outside. The conceptual category of the social private is incomprehensible 
for modern political and economic thought for which private actors are nec-
essarily self-interested; otherwise, they must be impersonal (public) actors 
(aut... aut). For the modern economy, a private subject can only be one who 
pursues interests that are primarily to his/her own advantage. Non-profit or 
private charitable entities, which do not act for private interests, are indeed 
contemplated as positive initiatives, particularly in order to remedy social ills, 
but are not considered to be subjects that produce socially and economically 
significant goods. 
At the time that the concept of the social private was first proposed (Do-
nati, 1978: 112-114), there was still no relational theory of the social sphere 
available that should have underpinned a redefinition of the social private 
as a possible space for the emergence of relational goods. The notion of the 
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social private, in any case, involved a conceptual framework that was com-
pletely new with respect to the sociological approaches then in existence; in 
particular, it aimed to overcome the dualisms peculiar to modernity. In 1988 
this author defined the relational good in the following terms:
Saying that human life is a «relational good» means to say that it is a type of shared good 
that depends on the relations enacted by subjects toward one another and that can be 
enjoyed only if they orient themselves accordingly. Human life is the object of enjoy-
ment (and thus of rights) not as an «individual» (in the sense of individualistic) good nor 
a «public» (in the modern technical sense) good, but precisely as a common good of the 
subjects that are in relation. Such a good must be defined not as a function of individual 
experiences taken singularly (privately) or collectively, but as a function of their relations. 
(Donati, 1989: 161-182).
In 1989 an American scholar, Carole Jean Uhlaner, used the term relational 
goods to indicate local public goods produced by the sharing of the political 
objectives of people who encounter one another repeatedly (Uhlaner, 1989: 
253-285). For her, relational goods are goods that cannot be enjoyed alone. 
Examples would include participation in a choir, soccer team, or some group 
volunteer activity. There is some relation between this idea and the model of 
joint production or the concept of «crowding in.» The definition of relational 
good that Uhlaner gives is the following: 
Assuming that people are restricted to such ends [optimization of individually possessed 
goods] is neither necessary nor useful. People also pursue relational goods which cannot 
be acquired by an isolated individual. Instead, these goods arise as a function of a relation-
ship with others. The relational goods can only be possessed by mutual agreement that 
they exist after appropriate joint actions have been taken by a person and non-arbitrary 
others4 (Uhlaner, 1989: 254).
These are thus goods (also things) produced by the consensus achieved 
among a certain number of subjects having interpersonal relations: an example 
could be deciding together to vote for a certain candidate in political elections.
The concept of relational good helped Uhlaner explain political participa-
tion in democratic states. Uhlaner wanted to understand why and in what 
way individuals actively participate in political life notwithstanding the senti-
ment that the individual vote has little influence on an election’s outcome. 
She found the answer in a model centered on individual rationality. In her 
view, relational goods are the product of rational individuals who together 
4 In an attempt at identifying their nature, she adds: «Relational goods can only be shared with some 
others. They are thus unlike private goods, which are enjoyed alone, and standard public goods, which 
can be enjoyed by any number. Relational goods are a subset of local public goods, as they enter into 
two or more persons’ utility function» (Uhlaner, 1989: 254).
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mobilize themselves in view of political elections in the same way as groups 
are organized to make political demands in everyday life. Relying on the ra-
tional choice approach, Uhlaner treated relational goods as public goods, an 
understanding of them that is completely within modernity and completely 
American. Since this author uses a rational choice approach (even if it is 
revised on the basis of a broader spectrum of strictly utilitarian motivations), 
her concept of relational good has had broad repercussions and has been 
widely used by economists. 
Those who have followed in Uhlaner’s footsteps, such as, for example, 
the economists Antoci, Sabatini and Sodini (2012: 802-814) have treated re-
lational goods as «things» chosen by individuals in cooperative games. Social 
relations are considered as means for obtaining material goods: hence, these 
authors’ thesis according to which relational goods are interchangeable with 
material things for the purpose of obtaining people’s well-being. These are 
clear distortions of the concept of relational good because the relational 
good is not fungible (it is not interchangeable) with material goods. It does 
not consist in the well-being that it procures to individuals but, rather, in the 
relation among them, upon which this well-being depends.
In the past two decades economists have used the concept of relational 
good in various ways, but they have done so without having a suitable theory 
of social relations. For mainstream economists, in fact, social relations are in-
dividuals’ intentional projections and strategic choices. Relational goods are 
considered to be social relations that take on a particular affective quality 
and foster cooperative rather than competitive games. 
For example, Benedetto Gui defines relational good as a special «encoun-
ter» between persons who exchange goods with a particular reciprocal 
fellow-feeling for each other; for him, relational goods are interpersonal 
relations that have a value to invest in for expressive reasons that make 
transactions more sympathetic and friendly (Gui, 1996: 260-278). Follow-
ing Gui, Robert Sugden defines relational goods as the affective and senti-
mental components (the latter understood as fellow-feeling) that support 
norms of cooperation (Gui and Sugden, 2005). These goods are the added 
value created by doing something together as opposed to doing it alone. 
This added value consists in the people’s affective states that assist indi-
vidual cooperative action. Here we are straddling economy and psychology 
within methodological individualism. For these authors, relational goods 
are found in markets for care giving services but also where the interaction 
is minimal, as in a walk in the mountains with a fellow hiker, for example. 
They are a source of direct value because they procure pleasure and in-
dividual well-being but are also of indirect value since they support the 
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motivations necessary for generating the trust and reciprocity that serve 
economic growth. The tradition in which the thinking of these authors is 
operating is that of A. Smith, and their analysis remains firmly anchored to 
economic debate.
In synthesis, for Uhlaner, Gui, and Sudgen, as for mainstream economists 
in general, relational goods do not coincide with relation as such because 
the relation is assessed from the point of view of feelings and individual 
action. For these authors, for example, friendship is a relational good in 
that, since it is constituted by interactions repeated with a certain affectiv-
ity, it grants a certain empathy and amiability to relations among people. 
The relational good is a quality of interactions that are repeated, leading to 
the sharing of something. In this way, the fact that the relational good is a 
relation that has its own reality (the relation’s order of reality) is totally mis-
understood. The fact that such a relation emerges because of reciprocity 
among participants is obscured. This is the reciprocity of the We-relation, 
which confers the quality and powers peculiar to the relational good. More-
over, in relational goods the «why,» that is, the motivation that propels one 
to act toward the other, is an essential element that cannot be reduced to 
convenience, even to an affective and sentimental sense of ease and, more 
generally, to the sense of well-being that individuals derive from the rela-
tion.5
A conception of relational good built on these bases cannot grasp the 
fully relational sense of the goods of which we are speaking.
THE TuRnInG POInT
A turning point in the definition of relational good came about when it 
was proposed to classify social goods on the basis of two axes, depending 
on whether the consumer is sovereign/non-sovereign and consumption is 
competitive/non-competitive (see figure 1). In this way, private goods are 
conceived as those characterized by a sovereign consumer and competitive 
consumption (cell 4), public goods are those characterized by a non-sover-
eign consumer and non-competitive consumption (cell 1) while in the sec-
ond cell (non-sovereign consumer and competitive consumption) we find 
another type of goods, that is, secondary (i.e., associative) relational goods. In 
5 As Aristotle already reminded us, the highest friendship, which contributes to eudaimonia/happi-
ness, can never be instrumental because it is a virtue.
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the third cell, we find goods with a sovereign consumer and non-competitive 
consumption. 
 
Source: P. Donati, La cittadinanza societaria [Societal Citizenship], Laterza, Roma-Bari 1993 
(2002), ch. 2.
Figure 1
The four fundamental types of  goods produced in society
Arrow A in figure 1 (between cells 1 and 4) indicates that private goods 
(lib) and public goods (lab) can be converted one into the other (the line is 
broken because this is a possibility). For example, if a set of private subjects 
that produce goods (such as electrical energy, transport, health services, etc.) 
are nationalized, private goods become public. Vice versa, if a good produced 
in a monopolistic system (such as telephone service, rail transport, the man-
agement of a water network, etc.) is entrusted to the competition of private 
subjects, we have the privatization of public goods. The user still receives the 
same functional service (even if at different prices). The nature of the good 
or service produced does not change.
Unlike private and public goods, relational goods are not interchangeable. 
They can indeed become private or public goods, but with this they perish 
because they lose the qualities and powers that are peculiar to them: they 
lose their peculiar relationality – which does not happen when there is the 
privatization of public goods or when private goods become public (these 
goods can certainly change in certain ways but do not alter their functional-
ity with respect to the service that they provide).
Arrow B in figure 1 (between cells 2 and 3) indicates that interchanges be-
tween primary relational goods and collective relational goods always exist 
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(for this reason, the line is solid). Empirical research demonstrates that there 
is continuity, and not discontinuity, between the relational goods produced 
in primary groups and the relational goods of larger and more formal organi-
zations (Donati and Prandini, 2007: 209-223; Tronca, 2008). Primary relational 
goods contribute to reinforcing secondary relational goods, and vice versa.
This scheme has had various subsequent empirical confirmations of its 
validity, in particular, the connections between a community’s or associa-
tion’s social capital and the production in it of relational goods (Pendenza, 
2008). At this point, I would like to synthesize what we know today about the 
requirements, qualities, and properties of relational goods.
A) Requirements. In order to come into existence, the relational good 
requires:
i)  a personal and social identity of the participants; no relational good 
exists between anonymous subjects because the relational good im-
plies that the actions that the subjects bring into existence refer to 
each one’s identity as a personal and social being;
ii)  a non-instrumental motivation of each subject in his/her involve-
ment with the other: interest toward the other must be characterized 
by caring; it must be about taking care of the other and not turning to 
the other to use him/her for some purpose other than the good that is 
intrinsic to the reciprocal relation as a good in itself, notwithstanding 
that it could also yield other outcomes (that is, positive externalities 
and an added social value);
iii)  that conduct is inspired by the rule of reciprocity: where reciprocity 
signifies symbolic exchange and not a do ut des; reciprocity implies 
that ego gives to alter that which alter needs or could give him/her 
pleasure, knowing that alter will do the same for ego when ego will 
have need of it;
iv)  total sharing: the relational good can only be produced and used to-
gether by those who participate in it, that is, it comes into existence 
if and only if the participants generate and enjoy it together; no one 
can produce it alone or can ask others to produce it without him/her, 
even only temporarily. 
v)  in general, it requires elaboration over time (the relation’s temporal 
history) and a simple interaction in the moment is not sufficient, such 
as, for example, an act of kindness or reciprocal empathy in a purchase 
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or in an exchange of objects; in short, the temporal register must be 
historical-relational and not interactional;6
vi)  a reflexivity that operates relationally, thus, not a reflexivity of an 
autonomistic type or one that is blocked or fractured; relational re-
flexivity is required in order for identity, reciprocity, and sharing to be 
enacted with reference to the good of the relation (as such), which 
must be produced and enjoyed together by the participants.
B) Qualities and properties. The relational good has the following quali-
ties and properties:
i)  it is an emergent effect, cannot be acquired otherwise, and is a way of 
satisfying primary needs. Saying that it is an emergent effect means that 
it requires a certain combination (not a simple aggregation) of factors, 
elements, or components as discussed above; its emergent character 
accents the fact that the relational good is a «third» entity that exceeds 
the involved subjects’ contributions and that, in certain cases, may not 
have been foreseen or thought of as the initial intention; 
ii)  it can be produced and benefited from only by means of the relations 
that make that good, and it cannot be exchanged or replaced by any-
thing else; in particular, it cannot be bought with money and cannot 
be produced on command or by law;
iii)  it is a good in that it corresponds to the fundamental primary needs 
of the human person and social groups, needs that have to do with 
sociability without which individuals would be monads unable to re-
alize themselves and be happy.
On the other hand, relational evils are the product of relations that do not 
have these ingredients and qualities. In relational evils we observe the lack of 
or deficit in one or more of the necessary elements (identity, non-instrumen-
tal motivations, reciprocity, sharing, temporal duration, reflexivity) or a lack 
of coherence or harmony among them. Above all, the relational evil is today 
connected to those pathological forms of reflexivity that are designated as 
blocked, hindered, or fractured reflexivity (Archer, 2003).
In essence, relational goods are those immaterial entities (intangible 
goods) that consist of social relations that emerge from subject reflexively 
6 For the three registers of social time (interactional, relational, and symbolic): cf. Donati (2011: 179-
181).
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oriented toward producing and enjoying together, in a shared manner, a 
good that they could not obtain otherwise.
We could ask what the role of relational goods is in relations, even dia-
lectical relations, between the state and civil society. To say it synthetically, 
relational goods are the new common goods, no longer understood as public 
things or public properties, but as goods co-produced by networks of per-
sons and social formations (the relational subjects) that generate them and 
benefit from them continuously without their having an «owner». In the fol-
lowing sections we shall explore this theme more deeply.
THE COnCEPT OF RELATIOnAL GOOD REDEFInES THE mAP 
OF COmmOn GOODS
The common good is often identified with the public good. Relational the-
ory, instead, posits a distinction between these types of goods. The common 
good should not be confused either with the private good or with the public 
good. What characterizes the common good is the fact that the advantage 
each person derives from belonging to a certain association or community 
cannot be severed from the advantage that others also derive from it. This 
means that each person’s interest is realized together with that of others, not 
in opposition to it (as happens with the private good) nor apart from others’ 
interest (as happens with the public good). 
In this sense, the term «common» (communis) is opposed to «proper» 
(proprium in the sense of «one’s own») as «public» is opposed to «private». 
That which is not one’s own (private) nor of everyone indiscriminately (pub-
lic) is common. The common good is the space of that which not only be-
longs to some people or even to everyone indifferently. It is not a collective 
good in the modern sense of a «state» good (belonging to the state). It is the 
privileged space of social relations when subjects are oriented toward pro-
moting the good of the relations existing among them and thus, also, toward 
caring for the objects that represent these goods (that is, common goods): for 
example, a shared house or a commons on the internet (such as Wikipedia). 
The common good, in its relational version, is not a concertative idea 
either, as some understand it to be. It is not the practice of political con-
certation typical of the neo-corporate democratic government. In the latter 
arrangement, actors hold biased interests and lay claim to them by taking a 
seat at a table from which they hope to rise seeing them satisfied, at least in 
good part, after a conflict characterized by bargaining. The relational good is 
not of this type. It puts the good of relations before that of individual, group, 
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or categorical interests. The relations alluded to by this good are those of 
subjects involved in the common needs that also pertain to the surrounding 
societal community.
The criterion for identifying those particular common goods that are re-
lational is based on the principle of positive reciprocity7, and not on that of 
equality of individual opportunities (at the start or as a result), which is pecu-
liar to individualism. Let us think about what this means for the relationships 
between the genders. Today, the common good between men and women is 
generally understood as the sum of individual goods acquired through indi-
vidual opportunities. This happens in the couple, for example, as well as in 
the job market where men and women face one another. The so-called «pure 
relation» theorized by A. Giddens (1992) is a relation in which each partner 
negotiates the maximum individual satisfaction; it is not a relational good. 
The equal opportunity programs in the work place try to equalize access 
to jobs and compensation between men and women as individuals; they do 
not have as objective the pursuit of a relational good. Instead, the relational 
good is a relation of reciprocity (or «symbolic exchange») between individu-
als which aims to build relational goods for and between them such as, for 
example, the balance between work and family life. Relational goods come 
from being in a relation of full reciprocity. They are neither an aggregation of 
individual goods nor a collective good that must be distributed among the 
participants. Relational goods are sensitive to intersubjective relations and 
cannot be the result of individual advantages (they do not guarantee that 
each person can pursue his/her own particular interest if this is incompat-
ible with the common good). 
Relational goods are the subset of common goods that can only be gener-
ated together: no one who takes part in them can be excluded from them; 
they cannot be sub-divided and are not the sum of individual goods. Saying 
that a common good is relational means that it is a type of good that 
depends on the relations enacted by the subjects toward one another and 
can be enjoyed only if the subjects orient themselves accordingly. In this 
sense, we say that human life is a common good in that it is the object of 
enjoyment and therefore of rights, not as a private, individual good in an in-
dividualistic sense, nor as a public good in the modern technical sense of a 
7 The term reciprocity here indicates relations in which the subjects give to one another and exchange 
things or services or, in any case, help one another in turn in a social network that acknowledges itself 
to be a circle of subjects cooperating among themselves. While being useful, reciprocity is not acti-
vated and maintained for instrumental reasons but for reasons of identity in belonging to a commu-
nity of reciprocal assistance. For this reason, sometimes the term «reciprocity» is interchangeable with 
that of «symbolic exchange». See Godbout (2007).
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state good, but precisely as a relational good of subjects who are in relation 
with one another. 
Present day society expresses the need for new common goods in a very 
precise phenomenological sense: common goods in the sense that only com-
munities of people, only primary and associative groups, can express and 
safeguard them. This is a new generation of rights; precisely, the generation of 
human rights, beyond civil and political rights and those of socio-economic 
welfare. When we appeal today, for example, to the child’s right to have a 
family that cares for him/her, we are appealing to a right that is human, not 
civil in the modern sense of the term8 or political or socio-economic. What 
category of rights is this? The answer cannot but be: a human right that is 
intrinsically relational.
The legal system has only recently begun to understand the need to in-
troduce this category of rights. We are referring to the type of rights that 
we can call relational because they involve a relational good (not a public 
or collective good). Beyond the grand assertions contained in international 
and national documents on civil rights of a liberal-individualistic matrix, it 
is necessary to develop a specific reflection on people’s rights to common 
goods and on the rights of common goods as such, in as much as they are 
relational goods. The latter are rights pertaining to those relational goods that 
enjoy the status of legal subjectivity (for example, a social cooperative: these 
are the rights of the cooperative and not only the rights of the individuals in 
the cooperative). This is a new area for reflection and social practices that is 
beginning to come to the fore in a mature way only today.
 The proof that today’s public ethics does not involve a common good in 
a relational sense is found in the case in which, for example, the problems of 
peace, development, the environment, and also of new forms of poverty, are 
not confronted as problems of concrete human relations enacted by co-pres-
ent subjects but are simply treated as «things» to eliminate by marginalizing 
violent persons, punishing those who do not succeed in competing, banning 
polluters, helping the poor with measures that promote passivity. Problems 
are confronted by putting people in conditions of not causing trouble. These 
are false solutions to problems because they are not inspired by the common 
good in that they leave aside completely the necessity of involving poor and 
marginalized people, deviants, and even those prone to violence in seeking to 
solve problems as common, shared problems. In the arena of social policies, 
it is very clear by now that these modalities for facing situations of distress, 
8 I remind the reader that the term «civil rights» refers to the individual rights promoted by market 
liberalism starting in the 1700’s (as the right to religion, opinion, association of the individual, and 
also the right of the person to physical integrity, due process in court proceedings, etc.).
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poverty, and social marginalization are completely unsatisfactory. Peace, de-
velopment, a clean and safe environment, a decent life for everyone – these 
are all goods that correspond to the relational character of these objectives: 
this is to say that they can only be achieved together; they are not a sum of 
individual expediencies but a function of the relational system that connects 
subjects in relation with one another and a function of their comprehensive 
internal and external relations.
non-competitive goods Competitive goods
Agent/
Actor is
con-
strained
1
In strictly public goods, 
relations are binding apart 
from individual interests 
(constrictive sharing) 
[whoever does not adapt is 
considered to be a deviant or 
a free rider] 
2
In secondary relational goods, 
relations are bound to prosocial 
ends, which means that individual 
interest depends on the relations 
that make up the common good, 
which has positive externalities 
for unknown others [whoever 
does not adapt weakens the 
common good or generates 
relational evils] 
Agent/
Actor is
free
3
In primary relational goods, 
relations are characterized 
by the symbolic exchange 
among those who belong to 
a primary group (face-to-face 
group) [whoever does not 
adapt weakens the group or 
generates relational evils] 
4
In strictly private goods, relations 
are purely instrumental or 
irrelevant [whoever does not 
adapt decreases his/her ability to 
compete] 
Figure 2
Four areas of  social relations differentiated on the basis of  degrees  
of  actors’ freedom and the type of  good produced (public goods, primary 
and secondary relational goods, private goods in a strict sense)
Relational goods are the key for moving from the welfare state to the 
welfare society. It is important to underscore that the common good takes 
on the form of a relational good in all the areas of welfare in which relations 
among human subjects are in play. Figure 2 synthesizes the various areas in 
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which socially significant goods are produced. Relational goods are found in 
the areas defined by cells 2 and 3. Outside of these areas of welfare, we find 
non-relational goods (and subjects). On the one hand (cell 1), we find public 
goods in a strict sense, which can and must be pursued through systemic or 
technological, redistributive apparatuses (such as the state’s fiscal revenues, 
public pensions, the state’s monetary transfers, services in which people’s 
participation is bound and constrained on the basis of legal requirements). 
On the other hand (cell 4), we find those strictly private goods (of the Dar-
winian market) that, in order to be satisfied, do not necessarily require a rela-
tion involving cooperation and reciprocity between buyer and seller.
It is nonetheless necessary to clarify that collective relational goods (sec-
ondary, associational), while they are peculiar to the Social private and Third 
sectors, can also be generated in the state and Market on condition that actors 
comply with the requirements that are specific to relational goods (which 
were discussed in section 4) because where they are produced is not impor-
tant but rather how they are produced. They can be pursued within each 
of these spheres and between them. The fact that in the lib-lab arrangement 
they are weakened and marginalized depends on the non-relational way in 
which the lib-lab system has until now configured the state and market and 
their relationships.
WHO ARE THE SubjECTS WHO GEnERATE RELATIOnAL 
GOODS? AnD unDER WHICH COnDITIOnS?
 Generally speaking, relational goods are the product of processes of asso-
ciation among individual agents/actors. The agents/actors can also be collec-
tive. But in that case the conditions for generating relational goods are much 
more complex and onerous. For this reason, it is quite rare that relational 
goods are able to emerge among collective subjects. It is necessary that the 
social context be non-competitive (that is, not combative). Relational goods 
can be and, indeed, are competitive goods, but in terms of solidarity in the 
sense of competition (cum-petere) as the search for the best solutions in a 
contest which is not detrimental to the other participants but stimulates 
each participant to contribute his/her best effort toward achieving the same 
common goal. 
For example, the components of the same sports team can create the rela-
tional good of their team. But a game played between two football teams, as 
in every competitive activity that must lead to a victor or, at least, to a ranking 
of winners and losers, cannot create a relational good. The combative con-
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text and its rules prohibit this. Instead, a second level organization that unites 
two or more mutual aid associations for the purposes of reciprocal coopera-
tion can, under certain conditions, create relational goods and therefore can 
be a relational subject that creates relational goods among participating as-
sociations.
Relational goods are produced by those relational subjects that operate 
according to the characteristics highlighted in the preceding sections (4 and 
5). Figure 3 synthesizes the placement of relational subjects in the societal 
arena.
We can find them in life-world spheres as primary groups and in the 
spheres of civil society as Third sector organizations and volunteer associa-
tions. Collective relational subjects do not necessarily have to be bound to 
any particular territory because means of communication can also create 
associative forms at a distance. However, the distance must allow for a mini-
mum of intersubjective relations. Figure 3 tells us that relational subjects 
cannot arise and exist either in the bureaucratic organizations of states (state 
apparatuses, such as the public administration) (cell 1) or in the capitalistic 
market of a Darwinian type (cell 4).
The goods produced are 
non-competitive
The goods produced 
are competitive
Agents/
actors 
are con-
strained
1
State Apparatuses 
(Public Administration) 
(G)
2
Collective relational subjects con-
stituted by organizations of the 
social private sphere, third sector, 
civil associations, and ngos 
(I)
Agents/
actors are 
free
3
Primary relational subjects 
constituted by primary groups
(families, informal networks) 
(l)
4
Capitalistic market 
enterprises (Darwinian) 
(a)
 Figure 3
The placement of  relational subjects among the four fundamental types 
of  social subjects (distinguished on the basis of  degrees of  agents/actors’ 
freedom and the type of  goods produced)
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Primary relational subjects are those characterized by intersubjective, 
face-to-face relations (in cell 3 of figure 3). Secondary relational subjects 
(in cell 2) are created in the social networks that weave together formal 
(professional) relationships and informal (non-professional) relationships on 
condition that the organizational relations are not purely functional but leave 
space to superfunctional action.9 The specificity of these networks resides in 
the fact of being institutions of social solidarity that produce positive exter-
nalities for third subjects and operate as training grounds for substantial, that 
is, civil democracy.
Relational subjects can be distinguished at three levels: micro, meso, and 
macro.
i)  On a micro level we find families, small groups, and informal net-
works that practice internal intersubjective relations with a relational 
reflexivity. Emblematic examples are many self– and mutual-help 
groups that present the characteristics discussed in sections 4 and 5.
ii)  On a meso level we find organizations that are broader and have a 
certain formalization of their structures and activities. These are the 
organizations of the social private sphere, the Third sector, and civic 
associations such as associations of social promotion, volunteer orga-
nizations, social solidarity cooperatives, and social networks on the 
internet. These can also be for-profit economic enterprises on con-
dition that they practice corporate social responsibility, that is, that 
they have as an objective the production of positive externalities (re-
lational goods) in favor of the surrounding community and that this 
objective is not instrumental to making a profit for the company but 
is envisioned as an ethical criterion of entrepreneurial activity. This is 
the civil economy.
iii)  On a macro level we find second and third level organisms that orga-
nize lower level relational subjects in an associative manner. We can 
think of those international non-governmental Organizations that, un-
like organizations that lobby States or international institutions, cre-
ate a network of local associative units that operate on a micro scale. 
Once again, it is necessary here to see whether there exist or not the 
conditions peculiar to a relational subject’s action.
9 With the term «superfunctional,» we mean an individual or organizational action that is not oriented 
toward the specialization of roles (that is, it is not guided by functional differentiation) but is ori-
ented toward the exercise of a plurality of functions that cannot be enumerated – and can also be 
latent – in that it operates with relations, on relations, through relations. In order to understand the 
superfunctional reality of the social sphere, it is necessary to abandon modernity’s functionalistic 
approach as was theorized by Talcott Parsons and Niklas Luhmann.
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We might wonder whether certain international organisms can be or be-
come relational subjects. These could be the un, the European Union, or the 
Mercosur. The probability that organisms of this type can be relational sub-
jects is practically zero owing to the fact that they never have the conditions 
of intersubjectivity and reflexivity that are necessary for producing relational 
goods. These are, generally speaking, instrumental organisms that conceive 
of the common good in aggregative and combinatorial terms, and never in 
relational terms. Nevertheless, in the abstract, we could imagine that in the 
future it would be possible to create macro level organisms that adopt a rela-
tional culture and realize at least some of the conditions peculiar to relational 
subjects. 
THE nEW CIvIL DEmOCRACy
Civil democracy (as distinct from economic, political, and social democ-
racy) is the form of societal governance that pursues the common good 
not as a state of things, nor as a sum or aggregation of single goods, nor as 
a super-ordinated reality, but as the totality of those conditions of social life 
that allow groups, as well as their individual members, to achieve their own 
perfection more fully and quickly through the creation of relational goods.
Over the course of the 20th century this vision was translated into the 
idea that ensuring the conditions for the development of people and their 
social formations meant providing assistance and state sponsored redistri-
bution using resources coming from the market. This way of thinking and 
acting came from afar. It was a legacy of the Enlightenment State inspired by 
concern for the population’s well-being and managed from above as a form 
of «good government» (politeia). It materialized starting from the absolute 
and later constitutional States established in Europe between the 17th and 
19th centuries.
Today we find ourselves facing a distinct historical discontinuity. With re-
spect to the past, generating the common good presupposes the relational 
participation of all those interested in such a good (which cannot be abstract 
entities but concrete personal and associative subjects in specific situations) 
and presupposes the nexus between each actor’s freedom and responsibility 
in producing the common good. Those who make reference to the classical 
political conception continue to identify the common good in the state, as 
its function and chief task. But there is a clear shift, even if it is gradual and 
tempered, of the concept of common good toward non-state political com-
munities. The new welfare cannot be produced either only from below (from 
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individuals), nor only from above (by an increasingly interventionist State), 
nor from a generic mixture of the two paths, but rather from a suitable rela-
tion – involving both subsidiarity and solidarity – among the members of a 
political community (understood precisely as the totality of those who must 
decide on their common good).
To arrive at a concrete definition of this vision, social theory must clarify 
the reality of the relational order, that is, the reality of the relations that sub-
stantiate the common good, and must see its autonomous potentialities in 
what we could call the «subjectivity of society,» which means seeing it in the 
capacity of civil society (defined as the totality of subjects –both individual 
and collective– that do not have roles in public institutions) to express so-
cial subjects (we should say «societarian» subjects) that generate relational 
goods. 
To this end, it becomes essential that there is integration between visions 
of the common good which imply different perspectives of what is called the 
principle of subsidiarity: the common good which only a political authority 
can guarantee from above (vertical subsidiarity, internal to the state hierar-
chical system), the common good which is peculiar to the relations between 
the state and civil subjects (which may be a horizontal subsidiarity, when a 
state apparatus promotes an action for the benefit of one or more civil sub-
jects independently, or a circular subsidiarity, when state and civil subjects 
act as reciprocal partners on a symmetrical ground), and the common good 
as defined in the relations among civil subjects only (lateral subsidiarity, for 
instance between companies and families).
ImPLICATIOnS FOR THE FuTuRE POLITICAL ORGAnIzATIOn 
OF SOCIETy
To the degree that the limitations and structural defects of the current 
model of the social (welfare) state can be seen, the alternative idea of a soci-
ety based upon a sound combination of subsidiarity and solidarity gains 
ground, a society that is pursued through the expansion of relational goods. 
This goes beyond a neo-lib/lab vision of the social State and of well-being 
because it emphasizes three fundamental things. 
First, it redefines well-being starting from subjects, which are simultane-
ously its recipients and architects. Second, it confers on the state the political 
role of guarantor of the common good, in as much as it decides the general 
rules but does not produce civil society or, even worse, a power system that 
sees (reads, interprets, enacts) civil society as a function of political hege-
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mony. Third, it abandons the philosophy which aims at including people in a 
single institutional order to embrace, instead, that of promoting different in-
stitutions in a plural order which rewards the best results obtained through 
the adoption of the principles of subsidiarity and solidarity.
It is indeed evident that civil society produces relational goods if and to 
the extent that it makes use of its own resources: in the first place, its moral 
resources (i.e., values and virtuous behaviors), which involve relying on a 
first person, rather than a third person, ethics. The failures of the lib-lab con-
figuration of society are due to the fact of having extolled third person ethics, 
abandoning, indeed destroying, first person ethics.
We could ask: why is the societal vision of the common good as a rela-
tional good, inflected in terms of a subsidiarity characterized by solidarity, 
more human? This is due to three reasons, basically. First, because it not only 
respects the choices of negative freedom (freedom from constrictions) but 
nourishes the choices of positive freedom (freedom for – i.e. in favor of – 
social finalities) of people and social subjects. Second, it does not forcibly 
impose solidarity but produces it by incentivizing and rewarding whoever 
adopts courses of action that produce relational goods. Third, it does not 
privilege exit solutions or those of mercantile competition but, rather, those 
that strive toward the construction of social autonomies able to combine 
universalism and particularity.
The superseding of the 20th century social State in the direction of a 
political system that promotes a civil society that can face the challenges 
posed by a globalizing world that generates ever new crises is not a simple 
operation. Certainly, it cannot be achieved within the framework of nego-
tiations and compromises between market and political democracy, merely 
conceding gracious acknowledgements to the Third sector, which remains 
residual and dependent on the first two sectors. The passage to a new social 
order is happening today under the aegis of a social morphogenesis (Archer, 
2013) that is enfranchising an «other» civil society with forms of sociality that 
are different from those of political institutions and the capitalistic market 
(Bruni and Zamagni, 2009).
Modernity asked itself whether the social State should have been all of or 
only a part of society. It has oscillated, in its ideologies and practices, from 
one pole to the other, configuring the state as the synthesis of everything 
(polarization of a lab type) or, vice versa, as a residual sub-system (polariza-
tion of a lib type). We risk remaining stuck in this game. To the question that 
modernity bequeaths to us, and that is, «Must the state still be everything or 
only a part?», the 21st century could answer by completely shifting perspec-
tive and configuring the state as a differentiated function of the political 
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body specialized in making sure that social processes do not create poverty 
and exclusion but, rather, wealth and social cohesion through the produc-
tion of relational goods. It addresses everyone (not only the poor), but as to 
this «everyone,» it is interested in what has to do with their conditions of 
participation seen as the result of a triangulation among risks undertaken, 
responsibilities assumed, and opportunities enjoyed. This means seeing the 
state as the specific sub-system that must politically govern society but must 
not replace it, nor colonize it, nor produce it. The State must come to a stop 
in front of that which does not pertain to it, that which is not available to it, 
such as the ethical sphere. It must be a means through which the community 
takes on the collective responsibility to include in social life those who can-
not or do not succeed in becoming part of it. 
The society of subsidiary solidarity has its political form in what we could 
call the «relational social State.» What is a relational State? In our opinion, it is 
characterized by the following modalities of configuration.10
1)  The relational State is no longer conceived as the Vertex and Center of 
society but as a functionally differentiated political-administrative 
sub-system for the governance of a society that is observed and en-
acted as a network of social (public, private, and mixed) subjects 
and institutions. In its aspect of institution, the state becomes an en-
semble of apparatuses that have specific political and administrative 
functions that must operate in a manner that is subsidiary – and rela-
tively symmetrical in terms of power – with respect to other funda-
mental sub-systems of society, and that is, the market, civil society, and 
the sub-system of the family and informal networks.
2)  The relational State is configured as a legal and social system that must 
realize complex citizenship. Citizenship is said to be complex for three 
orders of reasons:
i)  because it recognizes not only civil, political, and economic-social 
rights (as theorized by T. H. Marshall and others)11 but also human 
rights, which are the rights of the human person in relation to the 
social formations in which he/she develops and conducts his/her 
activities; these refer to over four generations of rights, the last of 
which is still being defined;
10 For more details see Donati (2004: 9-47).
11 Cf. Marshall (1992).
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ii)  because it interweaves citizenship in a state (traditional citizenship, 
defined as the individual’s belonging to a national State) and soci-
etal citizenship (defined as persons’ belonging to associative forms 
of civil society that are recognized as collective subjects – which 
are public but not of the state – acting with politically significant 
functions in the local, regional, national, or supernational sphere); 
and, with this, makes possible differentiated and multiple forms of 
citizenship;
iii) because complex citizenship does not make reference only to indi-
viduals but also to social formations of civil society (which consti-
tutes a reason for a sharp discontinuity with modernity); in effect, 
from a sociological point of view, the relational social State arises 
when typically modern (from the 19th-20th centuries) political 
constitutions are reformed through processes of constitutionaliz-
ing private spheres, that is, by attributing a political value (autho-
rizing binding collective decisions for the common good), and the 
connected public functions, to organizations of a non-state type.12
The relational State is de/centered and articulated in an associational (or 
federative) manner, whether upward (for example, the European Union) or 
downward (local communities and organizations of civil society). The con-
sequences for social policies are of enormous import. The passage from the 
traditional welfare state to the relational social State entails, in fact, at least 
three great structural changes.
In the first place, the symbolic code that presides over social inclusion 
(or cohesion) policies changes: the prevailing symbolic code is no longer 
that of the state (by which the common good is by definition of the state) 
but becomes what we can call a relational symbolic code (by which the 
common good is the relational one). In the second place, social policies be-
come a widespread function of society, that is, a function that is pursued by 
a plurality of actors, which are public and private, combined and intertwined 
(in relation) in various ways with one another (plural welfare, societal con-
ceptions, multistakeholders of welfare organizations, and still others). In the 
third place, the social policies, which until now have been upheld primarily 
by the two pillars of freedom (the lib side or that of the market) and equality 
(the lab side or that of the redistributive State), must institutionalize a third 
pillar, that of solidarity, as an autonomous and distinct pole that cannot be de-
rived from the other two. In this pole, ad hoc societal, plural, and subsidiary 
12 Cf. Teubner (2012).
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welfare institutions arise. Until now, social policies have treated solidarity as 
a by-product of policies pursued primarily through combinations of individ-
ual freedoms and equality of opportunity in welfare systems conceived as a 
compromise between State and market. It is not by chance that solidarity still 
does not appear as a value and end in itself alongside the other two values of 
the European Union’s master plan.
The relational social State expresses the need for a jump in quality toward 
a new configuration of freedom, equality, and solidarity that does not make 
social solidarity residual in that it does not understand the latter to be char-
ity or compensation for the weakest or marginalized members of society but 
places it on the same level as freedom and equality of opportunity. It does 
so also in terms of the elaboration of rights (new relational rights) and the 
production of goods and services (new relational goods) of welfare.
To synthesize: the relational social State conceives the common good to be 
a good that valorizes relations of reciprocal enrichment of free and respon-
sible actors who create welfare. It brings about a complex citizenship that 
operates by valorizing the principle of relationality applied to all of society’s 
spheres. Social policies are not understood as sectorial or residual policies 
for the poor or needy but as a general form of a reflexive action of society 
on to itself in terms of the production and distribution of social goods (in a 
broad sense), without separating normal conditions from particular condi-
tions (those that indicate risk or are deviant or pathological). The relationality 
that connotes complex citizenship operates at all territorial levels and in ev-
ery intervention sector as citizenship that must be extended to all potential 
actors (not as passive beneficiaries but, rather, as active subjects that choose 
it and put it into practice) (inclusive citizenship) and must be deepened, that 
is, made to be concrete and situated (deep citizenship). Relational modalities 
substantially alter the hierarchical, bureaucratic, disciplinary characteristics, 
as well as those regarding assistance and workfare, that have been typical of 
the traditional 20th century welfare state.
The contribution of relational subjects to substantial democracy consists 
in promoting the birth and development of civil welfare institutions that cre-
ate relational goods by acting with relational reflexivity. Sociological analysis 
must be able to grasp those phenomena that indicate how morphogenet-
ic society can evolve toward a structural and cultural arrangement able to 
promote the specific reflexivity that generates common goods as relational 
goods (Donati, 2012: 1-81).
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